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GOVERNMENT DETENTION OF A VESSEL AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The detention of a vessel for purposes of a safety inspection is within the power of 
the United States Government, given the government's interest in regulating 
maritime commerce. A detention for purposes of obtaining a criminal background 
check is justifiable when the facts indicate that the detaining party bas a reasonable 
basis for suspecting that the detained party is engaged in criminal activity. So long 
as such detention is minimally intrusive, the detention will not be violative of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
United States of America v. James Joshua Thompson, aka James Deas 
282 F.3d 673 (91h Cir. 2002) 
(Decided March 4, 2002) 
The subject of this action is the detention and subsequent search of the MIV IKEA. 
The M/V IKEA was traveling southbound when it was stopped by a U.S. Coast Guard 
vessel near the San Juan Islands. Defendant, James Joshua Thompson ("Thompson"), 
was operating the vessel and Kanwanjit Bassi ("Bassi") was the only other person on 
board. 
The Coast Guard stopped the boat in order to perform a safety inspection. During 
the inspection, the defendant was unable to provide the registration for the ship, claiming 
he had it taped to the window of the vessel and that it blew away. Although something 
was taped to the vessel, the inspector found this suspicious, because vessel registration 
papers are usually kept in a safer place. The inspector noted that the vessel had 
previously been registered in Idaho, as the vessel had an expired Idaho registration 
sticker, and inquired as to the identity of the vessel's registered owner. The defendant 
claimed it was registered to "a friend" but could not provide the name. In addition, the 
vessel was on a route favored by drug smugglers coming from Canada to the United 
States. Both these facts further aroused the suspicions of the inspector. The inspector 
then asked the defendant to produce life vests for everyone aboard. As he was retrieving 
the vests, the inspector was able to view the interior of the boat, which included a large 
duffel bag. Later, the officers were able to see another such duffel bag. From his 
experience, the inspector knew that the duffel was of a kind typically used by drug 
smugglers to transport marijuana. At the inspector's request, the defendant provided his 
name and date of birth, but refused to give his social security number. At this point, half 
way through the inspection, the inspector radioed back to his vessel for a background and 
warrant check for each of the individuals on the MIV IKEA. To do this, the inspector 
radioed the Coast Guard vessel, the vessel radioed the station on shore in Bellingham, 
which then radioed the Border Patrol office in Blaine, Washington, which actually 
performed the background check and relayed the infonnation back up the chain. 
While the background check proceeded, the inspector continued with his 
inspection of the vessel. When asked about the purpose of the trip, the defendant 
responded that the vessel was recently repaired and that they were on a test run. This 
seemed to be verified by a number of tools strewn about the deck, but the tools were 
brand new and the defendant and Bassi were physically clean. After the inspection was 
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completed, the Coast Guard detained the vessel for an additional 15-20 minutes while the 
background check was completed. The background check revealed that the defendant 
had a history of drug smuggling, that he was affiliated with the H ell's Angels motorcycle 
gang in Canada and that he had used an alias in the past, that of James Joshua Dean. On 
the basis that they had probable cause to search the ship, the vessel was detained for 
another 30 minutes while a search wan·ant was obtained. The search of the vessel turned 
up over 100 pounds of marijuana. 
The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana on the basis that the Coast Guard 
did not have sufficient probable cause to search the vessel. The district court conducted 
an extensive evidentiary hearing and found that the Coast Guard did not have probable 
cause to detain the MIV IKEA after the inspection was complete but before the results of 
the background check were known. Accardi ngly, the district court suppressed the 
manJuana. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the initial detention 
of the MIV JKEA to be within the Coast Guard's power. 14 U.S.C. §89(a) gives the Coast 
Guard broad authority to make "examinations and inspections" of vessels over which the 
United States has jurisdiction in order to prevent, detect and suppress violations of United 
States Jaw. Thus, the appellate court found the initial detention of the vessel for the 
safety inspection to be within the scope of the Coast Guard's power. 
The appellate court first considered whether or not it was appropriate for the 
Coast Guard to detain the MIV IKEA for the 15-20 minutes after the inspection was 
completed. United States v. Maybusher (735 F.2d 366, 372 [9th Cir. 1984]) held that 
"restrictions on a person's freedom of movement may be imposed to maintain the status 
quo while making an initial inquiry provided the force displayed is not excessive under 
the circumstances". In this case, the restrictions involved were that the M/V IKEA was 
tied to the Coast Guard vessel, that the defendant was not told he was free to leave after 
completion of the inspection and that the officers remained on board while the 
background check was completed. 
To determine whether an arrest occurred, United States v. Torres-Sanches (83 
F.3d 1123, 1127 [9th Cir. 1996]) held that "a court must evaluate all the surrounding 
circumstances, including the extent to which libetiy of movement is curtailed and type of 
force or authority employed". In that case, the court held that the appropriate inquiry is 
"whether the officers diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant". With this as a guidepost, the couti detetmined that the 15-20 minute 
delay was not unduly restrictive. In support of this, the court found that there was no 
threat of force or coercion by the Coast Guard and the delay was neither unreasonable nor 
unnecessary. The background check was performed quickly and competently, given the 
multiple relays of information involved. In addition, the appellate court found that the 
United States has a strong interest in protecting its borders and regulating the activities of 
maritime commerce, as was found in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez (462 U.S. 579, 
592 [1983]) and United States v. Watson (678 F.2d 765, 771-774 [9th Cir. 1982]). 
Because of this, the 15-20 minute delay was a pem1issible investigatory detention so long 
as it was based on reasonable suspicion by the officers that criminal activity may exist. 
The Ninth Circuit then determined that the Coast Guard had reasonable suspicion 
in this case. The court found the fact that the defendant was unable to supply the vessel's 
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registration, that he could not recall the name of the vessel's owner and that the vessel 
had an expired Idaho registration sticker to be sufficient to constitute reasonable 
suspicion. Other less persuasive factors included the defendant's story about the boat 
being on a test run, despite the tools being in new condition and the defendant's unsoiled 
appearance; that the inspector knew that the vessel was on a course typically used by 
smugglers and that the inspector knew that duffel bags of the type seen on the vessel were 
typically used in smuggling operations. 
Finally, the court considered whether or not the delay exceeded the permissible 
limits of an investigative detention. The court concluded that the investigation was 
minimally intrusive and that the investigation was conducted quickly and efficiently. 
Given the mobility of the ship, the proximity to the international border, the court found 
the additional 15-20 minute delay caused by the background check to be incidental when 
weighed against the United States' interest in "the prevention, detection and suppression 
of violations of laws in the United States". For Fourth Amendment purposes, the court 
found that "[the] detention was minimally intrusive until reasonable suspicion ripened 
into probable cause for the search and arrest of the smugglers." 
The defendant does not dispute that the Coast Guard had sufficient probable cause 
to search the vessel after the results of the background check were made known to the 
Coast Guard. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court order granting the 
defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for a new trial. 
George Schneider 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT AND THE PRIMARY DUTY RULE 
The owner of a vessel is absolutely liable for injuries arising from the vessel's 
unseaworthiness; the Limitation of Liability Act is an exception to absolute liability, 
and the owner of the vessel will be relieved of liability if the three prongs of the 
primary duty rule are satisfied. 
(Decided Aug. 7, 2002) 
Northern Queen, Inc. v. Kathryn Kinnear 
298 F.3d 1090 (9111 Cir. 2002) 
Northern Queen, Inc. ("Northern Queen") was a small, family-owned corporation 
which had two principal shareholders: Blake Kiru1ear ("Kinnear"), the president, 
managing, agent, and captain who owned 22 percent of the corporation shares, and 
Kinnear's mother, Linda Kinnear, the corporation's secretary/treasurer who owned 77 
percent. Kinnear's minor daughter owned one percent of the shares. Northern Queen's 
primary asset was the fishing ship LIN J ("the vessel"). 
In March of 1999, the vessel participated in the crab season in the northwest 
section of the Bering Sea. On March 9, 1999, Kinnear sent e-mails to his mother and wife 
indicating that the weather was turning bad and ice was becoming a concern. On March 
15, 1999 crabbing was interrupted due to worsening weather. The vessel spent the next 
two days gathering pots. By March 17 the vessel had gathered 62 crab pots, which 
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